despite measures in place to curb them. 8 In Hong Kong, enforcement actions conducted in 2014 alone on auction sites and social networks, led to the seizure of '11,796 items of suspected counterfeit goods with a total value of about HK$1.12 million. A total of 45 persons, including 21 men and 24 women aged from 14 to 58, were arrested.' 9 But for consumers and IP owners, considering intermediary online auction sites and market place providers liable for the activity of third parties and the goods sold on their sites is a more convenient way to obtain redress, mostly because the financial strength of the intermediary is likely to be far greater than any of the sellers using the site and its identity and location are readily available, making proceedings against the site much simpler. It is also a useful tool because, often, the auction platform is better placed to detect and stop the infringements and other frauds committed via its intermediary than individual buyers or national enforcers may be.
However, in many jurisdictions, legislation was adopted to carve out 'safe harbour' provisions protecting intermediaries. 2000 on Electronic Commerce (ECD) 11 also offers protection from liability for hosting activities 12 under Article 14 ECD. 13 The rationale for the adoption of a shield against liability is chiefly anchored in encouraging the development of intermediary activities which would be hampered if Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were overly burdened with liability for the third party content they carried. In Hong Kong no such general shield exists.
Rationale for bridging the liability gap in Hong Kong
There is a gap in the way online auctions and market places' liability is defined in Hong Kong.
There is indeed, no specific legislation to define the parameters within which Internet intermediaries hosting content for third parties can operate and what liability they ought to shoulder.
The regime applicable has been suggested to be one of strict liability 14 but it is not certain how such regime would be applied in practice. Internet intermediaries, whether they are ISPs or auction market platforms, may need to rely on different pieces of legislation. Protection is thus on a piecemeal basis. Worse, these intermediaries may often find themselves attracting civil liabilities (e.g. in the areas of defamation and copyright) even though they may not have any knowledge about the activity in question. The current framework in place in Hong Kong to 11 Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market [2000] OJ L178/1. In the UK, this Directive was implemented via the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 , SI 2002 /2013 Hosting consists in the storage of content for third parties. 13 This article offers a defence against damages claims and criminal liability in cases where 'a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity is apparent; or b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information.' Article 14 was implemented in the UK via Regulation 19 Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 , SI 2002 /2013 control liability for defamation and copyright infringement is, in our view, unhelpful regarding the liability of online auction intermediaries as explained below.
Unsatisfactory Defamation laws
Online auction platforms or other online intermediaries may offer bulletin boards or forums to facilitate communications between the users of their services. Such bulletin boards enable users to participate in exchanges with others, and they can view other members' messages or post their own messages as they wish. Intermediaries may be liable for messages if they are considered to be publishers in common law. Further issues can arise if hyperlinks are used since materials contained in a hyperlinked publication may constitute publication. The internet is an extremely flexible medium of communication and enables easy publication of different forms of material including pictures, videos and sounds. The question therefore is what amounts to publication and whether such intermediaries are regarded as publishers. The traditional common law rule is that a person who intentionally or negligently takes part in the publication of another's defamatory material is equally responsible for the publication as the original author.
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This is especially true when the intermediary failed to remove another's defamatory posting within its control.
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It is indeed a regime anchored in the common law that has mostly focused on controlling liability for defamatory materials. . 17 The case of Oriental press Group Limited v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd 18 in 2012 was the first Hong Kong decision taken by the Court of Final Appeal on website host liability. 19 Whilst the respondents are forum operators and not online auction platforms, an analogy can be made particularly when web users are allowed to ask questions or post comments on these online auction platforms. In Fevaworks, the plaintiffs brought actions of libel against the defendants. The defendants were operators of a website which host a popular discussion forum for a variety of interests. Messages alleging the plaintiffs involving in triad and criminal activities were posted on the forum. At first instance, the court found that the defendants were not primary publishers but subordinate publishers. They were not liable because the defence of innocent dissemination was successfully invoked. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Final Appeal. At issue was whether internet discussion forums could be regarded as publishers and if so, the extent to which such publishers could rely on the common law defence of innocent dissemination.
The court found for the defendants and held that whether or not a person is the main publisher depends on two things. A person is a primary publisher if he knew or could have easily acquired knowledge of the content of article in question ('the knowledge criterion') and that he had the ability to control or to prevent the publication of such content ('the control criterion'). Ribeiro J held that the defendants were publishers from the outset because they facilitated and participated in the process throughout. establish the defence of innocent dissemination, he will not be responsible for that publication.' 23 Whilst the court considered the defendants to be publishers at the outset, it differed from the conclusion in Thompson. In Thompson, the defendant was liable as the main publisher for re-broadcasting a live programme produced by Channel 9 because it was the defendant's choice that the telecast is as near instantaneous and the defendant had full control of how and when the programme is to be transmitted. Ribeiro J in Fevaworks observed that publications over the internet are very different from a broadcasting channel in the sense that the internet involves an interactive, 'many-to-many' communications which is different from the 'one-tomany' model that broadcasting channels adopt.
The Fevaworks case established the control test and the knowledge test in determining liability for forum operators but the decision is not clear cut. As seen from the above, the court agreed that any disseminator publishes a libel unless he or she can raise the defence of innocent dissemination. The effect is to place the burden on the defendant to raise the defence, even if he or she had little or no control over the publication. Although an online intermediary exercising minimal control over the publication of material by web users is likely to invoke the defence 818. 21 In fact the defendants designed its forum to be a user-friendly one permitting users to browse and post on their forum as well as employing administrators to monitor the users' discussions.
22 (1996)186 CLR 574, 586. of innocent dissemination successfully, it arguable whether such mere facilitators should be regarded as publishers from the outset and if they are not regarded as publishers, they should not be given the burden to raise the defence.
In any event, it may not be ideal to rely on developments in case law in an area that is evolving at such a fast pace. It is unfortunate that the Hong Kong Defamation Ordinance (DO) 24 does not contain a provision similar to section 1 of the United Kingdom's Defamation Act 1996
which categorises the roles of authors, editors and publishers. The statutory defence in section 25 DO is of limited assistance since it is only available to those who unintentionally published defamatory materials and the defence can only be used provided that an offer of amends is made by the defendant. Unless there is a specific provision 25 which offers specific protection to online intermediaries, such intermediaries may only rely on the Fevaworks decision which may not be satisfactory.
Unsatisfactory Copyright Laws
Another area where online auction platforms may be liable for another person's act is in the area of copyright. 48 See https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/09/supreme-peoples-court-regulations-concerning-some-questions-of-applicable-law-in-handing-civil-dispute-cases-involving-the-use-of-information-networks-to-harm-personal-rights-and-interests/ accessed 24 May 2016.
interests through the use of information networks. 49 Article 4 of the SPC regulations made it mandatory for an ISP to disclose the identity and contact details of the suspected infringer to the court and failure to do that would result in punitive measures directed against the ISP.
Article 5 also states the notice given by the aggrieved party should contain the name and contact method of the notifier, the indication and location of the harmful content as well as an explanation for deletion of such harmful content otherwise the ISP may be exempted from liability.
Since the basis of liability under article 36 of the Tort Liability Law rests on knowledge, the SPC Regulations provide a list of factors in assessing knowledge including whether the ISP selected, recommended, edited or in other ways processed the harmful information; the ability to manage information; the type of rights infringed and the degree of clarity as to whether the information is unlawful; its social influence and hit rate; the technological possibility for the ISP to adopt preventive measures and whether reasonable measures were adopted in relation to repeating infringers. Thus it can be seen that ISPs will be jointly liable for the misconduct of subscribers in relation to the infringement of civil rights and shall include copyright infringement and defamation.
The 2013 regulations were adopted to address the concerns of online piracy and article 20 provides for a mere conduit defence for an ISP if it does not select or modify the work in question. Article 22 states that a network service provider that provides information storage space shall not be liable provided that it does not alter the work, does not know or has no justified reason to believe that the materials are infringing, has no directly obtained economic benefits from the infringing materials and deleted such materials after receiving notification from the copyright owner. Thus in Shanghai Xinchuan Online Co Ltd v Tudou.com Co Ltd 50 , the operator of the video sharing website www.tudou.com was denied immunity simply because by organising the movies uploaded by its users into various channels, the court ruled that it knew of the possibility that infringing movies would be uploaded on its website. There was therefore an expectation that the site would monitor uploads and would remove any infringing ones expeditiously. Needless to say, this test is much more demanding that that devised in the EU (as explored further on) and there is no doubt that online auction sites, who do benefit financially from the placing of listing selling fake items would ensure that the host is denied immunity also. fact, the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2014 serves as a useful guide in determining ISPs' liability, although it is only catered for copyright liabilities. The authors strongly favour the use of the EU regime to assess the conditions that need to be complied with in order to be exempted from liability. It is however noted that it is by no mean a perfect standard and its operation in Hong Kong would need to be adapted and clarified in places as the below explains.
The evolving liability of online auction site in Europe
The EU regime is built around Article 14 ECD. One interesting aspect of the EU regime is that it has evolved with market conditions. The initial wording of Article 14 has not been changed but its interpretation has shown that the EU regime is adaptable, a characteristic which would benefit any new Hong Kong regime to be put in place. Indeed, the received wisdom was that while intermediary online auction sites and other intermediaries could do more to eradicate dubious practices on their sites, the ECD was simply not forcing them to do so. 59 In that sense, the EU regime was for many years akin to the US regime where the liability of hosts seemed contained and any prospects of a successful lawsuit was illusory. -Only 'neutral hosts' are granted immunity.
-The neutral host also needs to behave like a 'diligent economic operator' in its discovery and removal of litigious materials.
-It is now possible to impose some restricted monitoring obligations on online auction intermediaries under certain circumstances.
The Neutrality test as standard for immunity threshold
According to the CJEU, hosting services do not benefit from an automatic exemption of liability, but rather from an exemption on condition that they are 'neutral', an interpretation it had 62 Riefa, above n 36. already adopted in the a series of cases concerning the liability of Google (search engine).
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The CJEU decided to embed that neutrality was a prerequisite to benefit from the exemption of liability under Art 14 ECD regardless of the type of site the test is applied to. The court indeed uses the same standard for online auction site that it used for search engines. From a legal analysis perspective, the CJEU's approach rests uneasily with some commentators and judges. 66 But it has the benefit of creating a unique set of tools to evaluate liability, regardless of the subject matter, and to look at liability of intermediaries in a more objective way. This is a standard which would be most beneficial to use in Hong where presently is governed by a number of different laws, contributing to uncertainty. 67 L'Oréal (n 63).
68 Ibid ruling 6. At para 112, the Court stated that it was 'essential' that the provider be an intermediary within the meaning intended by the legislature, i.e. a 'neutral' host (under the interpretation the CJEU gave of the intentions of the legislature it referred to). The Court added at para 113: 'this is not the case where the service provider instead of confining itself to providing that service neutrally by a merely technical and automatic processing of that ought to be settled by statute in Hong Kong concerning the notion of what is an active role (or a neutral one). The court focused on assistance as a key factor to assess neutrality, a notion not defined in the ECD. It explained that when assistance is provided, the online auction platform 'must be considered not to have taken a neutral position'. 69 But the notion of 'assistance'
is not neatly packaged in the decision nor is it neatly described. It is defined, through a nonexhaustive list of examples, and by opposition to neutral activities. The CJEU noted that the mere fact that the operator of an online marketplace stores offers for sale on its server, sets the term of its service, is remunerated for that service and provides general information to its customers cannot have the effect of denying it the exemption from liability provided by Directive 2000/31.
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By contrast, the CJEU found that where the operator has provided assistance which entails, in particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to have taken a neutral position between the customer seller concerned and potential buyers, but to have played an active role of such kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, the data relating to those offers for sale. the data provided by its customers, plays an active role of such kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over those data'.
'Assistance intended to optimise or promote certain offers for sale' therefore tips the balance towards an active role. 72 Strictly speaking the court identified four ways in which eBay probably assists sellers. 73 They are:
-assisting sellers in order to enhance their offer for sale,
-setting up online shops,
-promoting and increasing sales -advertising products on search engines such as Google.
The intensity in the assistance provided is an important factor that ought to be assessed. The CJEU suggests that assistance, which entails optimisation of the offers, gives the online auction intermediary an active role, barring immunity. The concept of 'optimisation' however is not explained and is actually used as a synonym of 'enhancement'. 74 Yet, according to the Oxford Dictionary, to 'optimise' is to make the best or most effective use of something. By contrast, to 'enhance' means to 'intensify or improve'. Both terms communicate a similar idea, but they are in fact different degrees of improvements. Optimisation is a higher form of enhancement, a distinction not made clear by the CJEU. It results that any activities below this enhancement threshold, so to speak, remain neutral. Anything above will potentially render the intermediary active. The question therefore is to define what services or activities carried out by an online auction site will provide assistance in optimising (or enhancing) the presentation of an offer of such nature that they will give the intermediary an active role of such a kind so as to give it 72 Ibid para 114. active role being played, or if one particular activity will automatically tip the provider into 'activity'. Although the accumulation of activities is likely to make a more convincing case for an online auction intermediary being active rather than neutral, the French court did not think that the accumulation of services offered was sufficient in this instance.
3.3.1 'Relationship' and 'payments' as more viable criteria to assess assistance and neutrality When listing items on intermediary websites, some basic services tend to be free, but more advanced features and services normally need to be paid for, thus providing the website with an additional revenue stream. In Google, Advocate General Poiares Maduro pointed out that the search engine was neutral when it comes to natural results, i.e. results that are the product of automatic algorithms generating links. This was because those results are ranked and presented by reference to their relevance to the keyword searched and not based on Google's interest in bringing any particular site to the user's attention. By contrast, Google is active when users are paying Google so that results are prominently displayed through Adword. 79 The notion of a 'relationship' is not a criterion discussed in L'Oréal v eBay. Yet, it appears a viable alternative to the notion of optimisation. AdWords is a service that optimises the visibility of the search results. By analogy, online auction sites could be considered neutral when hosting data posted by users via their most basic listing service, but could lose such classification when users make use of features enabling their listing to 'stand out' and decide to opt for a subtitle or additional photos for example. In those cases, the online auction platform or market place has a more closely defined vested interest in the sale and better knowledge and control over the data, since it will have taken payment for some of the features used by the seller. In order to characterise knowledge or control it seems that payment, which the CJEU was quick to discard in both Google and L'Oréal, also is a viable factor of assessment that ought to be pondered in Hong Kong when considering a new uniform test for all online intermediaries. For example, in GEMA v RapidShare, 81 Germany's Bundesgerichtshof found that the file-hosting service facilitated copyright infringements and lost its neutral role because it offered 'premium accounts' for remuneration which were only attractive and useful for sharing illegal content.
Those accounts provided financial incentives based on the number of downloads. 82 Payments cannot be considered in isolation, but ought to be considered alongside the 'relationship' developed by the parties and the involvement/role played by the online auction platform. Indeed, by receiving remuneration for the services in question, online auction platforms both forge a relationship with the sellers and, through payment, acquire the knowledge and some control over the data hosted. But such control could also be acquired without any payment and thus payment in itself is not an absolute test for control. However, processing the payment for the corresponding data to be hosted is very likely to provide knowledge. Similarly, in the absence of payment, it is very likely that any additional photos or premium features would no doubt not be disclosed by the online auction site thus giving it control.
The link between a 'relationship' and knowledge or control over data is even more apparent when considering the assistance provided to PowerSellers, top-rated traders, as well as to users opening an eBay shop (or equivalent services on other online auction intermediary sites and a requirement that the online auction platform be 'aware' of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent. Although the Directive does not spell it out clearly, the reason for such difference is explained by the fact that 'actual knowledge' applies to criminal liability (the most demanding benchmark), whereas for claims for civil damages, 'awareness' is sufficient to trigger liability under EU law.
'Awareness' is normally a standard that applies by reference to the reasonable man. An online auction site would be deemed to be "aware of circumstances from which it would have been apparent to the service provider that the activity was unlawful" if a reasonable man, with the same knowledge, would have reached the conclusion that the activity or the information in question is illegal.
Who is the diligent economic operator?
When what is at stake is civil liability the threshold of knowledge is lowered. However, there still needs to be a defined cutting point at which the intermediary acquires sufficient awareness to justify liability in a claim for damages. In L'Oréal v eBay the CJEU explains that The 'diligent economic operator' is therefore substituted to the reasonable man as a reference point to assess the liability of online auction sites and market places. The CJEU, however did not elaborate or define the notion and how it may differ from national frames of reference.
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More is likely to be expected from the diligent economic operator. Indeed, the Oxford Dictionary defines 'diligent' as meaning hard working or showing care and effort. Thus, the obligations of the diligent economic operator revolve around a duty to remove all material this operator can identify as illegal, not simply when the material is clearly illegal but also when a little more hard work may be required to uncover this illegality. But one other important consideration to factor in is also its knowledge of the platform operated by such diligent economic operators. The reasonable man is an objective standard, but the diligent economic operator test is applied with the knowledge and expertise the operator in question has and the amount of control the operator has and his ability to do something about the illegal material discovered.
Further, Kaschke v Gray established the principle (obiter) according to which awareness needs to also be interpreted by reference to the apparent illegality of an activity or information hosted 89 In France for example it is the 'bon père de famille', the good father, the good family man that is used as a standard.
by the online auction platform. 90 The display of pornographic images depicting children is undoubtedly illegal and should prompt the reasonable man as well as the diligent economic operator to remove content. This type of material is 'obviously' 91 illegal. However, the sale of a fake handbag or a perfume via parallel import, is a lot more difficult to detect and identify as illegal activity or information. 92 There will be situations where the seller in the text of the advert itself declares the fake nature of the product. Then the illegality ought to be apparent. But when it is not, it is not clear if the diligent economic operator should be able to tell that a handbag is fake or that a perfume was destined for another market when the reasonable man surely was not be able to. 93 Those questions were not answered by the CJEU and ought to nevertheless be considered for any new legislation in Hong Kong. merely requires the court to 'have regard to the extent to which any notice includes such details'. 107 This suggests that not all details are necessary for the provider to have acquired actual knowledge. The judge did not require actual knowledge of a 'specific infringement or a specific copyright work by a specific individual'. Hence, the more detailed the notice, the more likely it will be that a court concludes that the provider had knowledge and, by default, sufficient awareness. In the end, what it turns on is that the notice be 'sufficiently detailed and gives a reasonable opportunity to investigate the position', 108 an interpretation consistent with the CJEU's requirements in L'Oreal v eBay.
Intermediaries' own investigations in the acquisition of knowledge and awareness
According to the CJEU, this may be one way for the provider to become aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator should have identified the illegality. 109 In the aftershock of the L'Oréal decision it does not seem possible for online auction platforms to simply await notifications before acting. However, it remains unclear if a diligent economic operator has to proceed with investigations on a regular basis or in any particular fashion or if it can wait to be prompted. Yet, the fact that the standard has moved from the 'reasonable man' to the 'diligent economic operator' requires more regular checks and any notification, even if vague, should prompt further investigation to fulfill that standard. The law would benefit from spelling out the way in which those checks ought to take place and how far they have to go to be satisfactory.
107 Ibid para 137.
108 Ibid para 149.
109 For example, in the case of eBay c/ DWC it is as a result of eBay's own investigation, following the site becoming aware of a press article criticising one eBay trader, that eBay closed without warning four accounts held by DWC.
5.

Obligations of the Online Auction Platform on Acquiring the Required
'Knowledge' or 'Awareness'
Where it can be established that a neutral online auction platform has acquired actual knowledge or awareness, the intermediary is under an obligation to remove access to the litigious material expeditiously under Article 14(1)(b) ECD. If the online auction provider does not comply it can be subject to injunctions to force compliance. Under Article 14(3) ECD it is possible for courts or administrative authorities to force providers to terminate or prevent an infringement or establish procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information but injunctions can also be adopted without the need to show that a provider had actual knowledge or awareness of particular infringements.
'Expeditious' Removal of the Illegal Material
Expeditious take down is required upon discovery. However, it is unclear how quickly the take down must take place to benefit from the immunity granted by the Directive and more precise guidelines are necessary. 110 In particular, in cases where the provider is on notice, pressure may be felt to remove material as soon as possible, so as not to engage liability. Unscrupulous competitors may however use notice and take down procedures as a means to impede sales on online auction websites, and caution may therefore be required. 111 In addition, information is often difficult to confirm as infringing or more generally as being 'illegal'. The provider may therefore need to take some time after receipt of the notice to decide if take down is required.
Some research conducted with a sample of UK ISPs and hosts showed that 'take-down periods varied hugely from 24 hours to about a week, depending on the type of content and the size of the organisation'. 112 However, in the context of auctions or market place sales, the speed of removal should be relatively short because auctions or sales have a limited life span of normally a few days. Therefore, if removal does not happen before the expiry of the sale, the process is ineffective. Organisations will continue to vary in size and financial might, and not all online auction providers will be able to locate information and decide on its 'legality' at the same speed. This may be because of a shortage of qualified staff or because of a large volume of sales hosted on the site. The speed of removal would also depend on how knowledge or awareness is acquired. If it is acquired via a precise and substantiated notice, one would expect take down times to be shortened, because the details concerning where on the server the information is placed, will be provided to the intermediary. Therefore the current solution prevailing in the Copyright (amendment) Bill 2014 in Hong Kong, which leans towards immediate removal, may be a workable solution for online auction sites but would need some amendments to adapt it to the nature of the auction business. At least an interim suspension while the provider investigates ought to be considered. If it was used, it could suspend the auction and restart the clock when the auction is reinstated. Less than precise notice may require a longer lead time; so will information the intermediary stumbles across, if verifications concerning the legality of the information are necessary. Here possibly the quality of the software used by the intermediary to track activity and the technology used to detect illegal activity will also have to be taken into account.
The Prevention of Future Infringements
A really useful tool to prevent illegal activity on intermediary websites is to rely on the platform itself to monitor activities so that they do not reoccur. Prevention is a useful policy, but in could not impose an obligation to monitor content on the intermediary in application of Sections 8(2), 11(1) (1) and (2) TDG (the German Teleservices Act). However, the Federal Supreme Court considered that whilst 'eBay could not be expected to examine every offer for potential unlawful content, it was nonetheless effectively participating in the sale of pirated goods via the commission it was due'. The Court decided that eBay ought to prevent, not only any specific listing, whenever its attention is drawn to it, but also use a filtering software to prevent any further infringement of the same type. There were, however, some limitations imposed by the court, and the decision was by no means the recognition of the full liability of online auction sites at the time it was taken. In SABAM, 117 a case concerning a collective management company representing authors, the CJEU looked into the limits of Article 15 ECD. It found that the injunction, which imposed on an ISP an obligation to install a filtering system to prevent file-sharing was in breach of Article infringements of not only existing works, but also future works. This injunction obliged the ISP to actively monitor all the data relating to each of its customers in order to prevent future infringements of intellectual property rights, and amounted to general monitoring. As a result, trademark owners and others seeking injunctions cannot hope for a blanket injunction banning the sale of products on online auction sites. However, they can seek that the website is asked to monitor similar sales made by the same seller or for a seller's account to be closed in order to prevent the same seller further infringing rights in respect of the same trademark. 118 Indeed, specific monitoring is something that the Bundesgerichtshof also sees as possible as long as it does not put the business itself at risk. 119 Should the intermediary facilitate infringing activities, the extent of the monitoring obligations to be imposed can be widened. 120 In Coty, the German court imposed the filtering of offers by keywords in both the offer titles and their descriptions.
It concluded that eBay needed to prevent infringing offers from being posted in future, in so far as this was reasonable. It added that automatic filtering did not exclude that some degree of manual inspection can reasonably be expected.
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118 However, this may have to be balanced with freedom of expression and other rights such as data protection.
For more on those questions, see Van Eecke (n42) 1455-502. This measure alone is very likely to change the way online auction platforms proceed to monitor/uncover infringements on their websites because it gives a clear licence to intellectual property owners to apply for injunctions against online auction intermediaries, many a time easier to locate than the infringers themselves. But to prevent future infringements, the CJEU allowed that online auction sites be ordered to take measures to make it easier to identify intellectual property infringers, facilitating the pursuit of claims against primary infringers, suggesting that IP owners will have to continue to pursue direct infringers. 
6.
Conclusion
Online auction intermediaries and other market places are well established in Hong Kong.
When acting as hosts, their legal obligations are uncertain because Hong Kong Law is not yet defined in this area. The liability gap in Hong Kong will most likely require legislative intervention. Out of the possible models for intervention, the EU approach of offering a uniform test for different liabilities and different intermediaries offers a viable starting point. It is because intermediaries will be subject to the same test and with the regime having grown across the years and refined by case law, more certainty can be achieved. While developed at a time where imposing liability was seen as an impediment to electronic commerce, the latest wave of cases indicate a push towards a more responsible industry where only neutral hosts can escape liability. The standard for liability has thus been raised. However, the EU model, also needs to be refined and adapted in Hong Kong. Refinement will center around adapting the legal regime to the geographical and cultural environment, but also improving on the way the CJEU went about defining a new legal regime, not apparent from the wording of Article 14 ECD. The way this liability or lack of immunity under Article 14 ECD is to be assessed indeed remains unclear and will no doubt lead to further conflicts in interpretation as national courts grapple with the concepts of 'neutrality', 'diligent economic operator', 'expeditious removal'
and the monitoring and prevention of future infringements. The route chosen by the CJEU to assess liability is a test that requires the intermediary to behave in a neutral way if it wishes to benefit from the immunity that Directive 2000/31/EC provides. Yet, neutrality is not defined in the Directive or in national law, and the CJEU gave little by way of explanation on how to interpret it. The neutrality test developed by the CJEU primarily rests on assessing the 'assistance' the online auction host provides to its users. However the legislator in Hong Kong ought to frame the test as a two-pronged test, where assistance is assessed by reference to the level of relationship developed between the platform and its user. It is primarily the degree of assistance that needs to be assessed, on a case-by-case basis, to determine the role played by the online auction platform. In addition, such relationship needs to be assessed by reference to the degree of knowledge or control it gives the online auction platform over the data hosted. Therefore, a loose relationship without knowledge or control over the data would return an assessment of neutrality, and thus immunity for the platform. By contrast, the closer the ties, the more developed the knowledge of or control over the data hosted. Not defining this notion careful would mean that it remains a moving target and impact on legal certainty.
A second hurdle, once neutrality has been established, is to show that the intermediary has knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances pointing to the illegality of content. This is not always an easy task because the way such knowledge or awareness is acquired is again not defined in the ECD and here again more details may need to be defined to offer a more workable system in Hong Kong. In particular, the difference of thresholds between infringements leading to criminal sanctions (knowledge standard) and those leading to civil remedies only (awareness standard) many need to be more carefully thought out as well as the level of details required for notice and take down and how knowledge following a notice may be constituted.
More importantly, defining who a 'diligent economic operator' is appears essential. The notion is not defined under EU law with potentially damaging consequences to legal certainty. We believe that expectations are higher on the diligent economic operator than they have otherwise been by reference to other standards such as the 'reasonable man', thus pushing online auction sites to be more proactive in their dealing with data they host on their servers but it is currently not clear if it would be the case. The adoption of such an interpretation in Hong Kong would have the benefit of ensuring stronger protection for users of online auction platforms and market places. This however needs to be balanced in light of the actual 'health' of the market, in order to ensure that too strong protection will not stifle the development of electronic commerce in this area.
The third step, once knowledge or awareness is established, is to proceed with expeditious removal of the material in question. This is here again an area where some confusion reigns in Europe, as the length of time required to proceed with this varies. More importantly, once data has been removed the delicate question of monitoring data to avoid repeat infringements is still debated by the courts. The limits of Article 15 ECD seem to guard against general and allencompassing monitoring obligations. However, specific monitoring, which can be more or less demanding, depending on the sites' involvement, is perfectly feasible. Its limits ought to be considered by the Hong Kong legislator in order to strike a feasible balance between IP owners, consumers and online auction platforms and market places' interests.
